Recent scientific work led by Dr. Peter Daszak and researchers at Nature.Health.Global (NHG) has drawn urgent attention to the coronavirus threat in Asia, especially a virus known as swine acute diarrhea syndrome coronavirus, or SADS-CoV. 

Their study revealed that SADS-CoV is both more diverse and more dangerous than previously recognized. Researchers analyzed over 500 known viral sequences and added 186 new ones from Chinese bats, showing enough genetic variation to classify at least two distinct coronavirus species. The horseshoe bat (Rhinolophus affinis) was confirmed as the main reservoir, with other bat species like Rhinolophus sinicus and thomasi also playing key roles in viral evolution. Evidence points to Guangdong province in southern China as the origin of the first spillover into pigs.  

The study also found that SADS-CoV clusters locally, spreading mainly within regions rather than over long distances. More alarmingly, the virus can replicate efficiently in human lung and intestinal cells in the lab, and it proved lethal in suckling mice, triggering brain inflammation. Both are seen as red flags for spillover risk.

By mapping bat habitats against pig and human populations, researchers identified southern China and northern Vietnam as hotspots for pig infections, while areas of greatest human risk include the southern coast of China, Java and central Thailand. The study also confirmed that SADS-CoV has been circulating in Chinese pigs since 2016, with notable recent re-emergences.

Briefly, SADS-CoV first emerged in southern China in 2016, when it caused catastrophic outbreaks on pig farms. Thousands of piglets under five days old died from acute diarrhea and vomiting, with mortality rates close to 100 percent. The virus struck again in 2021 (Guangxi province) and 2023 (Henan province), killing thousands more piglets. Studies suggest it spilled directly from bats, especially from the horseshoe bat to pigs, and may now be entrenched in Chinese pig populations, with surveys in 2022–2023 showing antibodies in nearly 60 percent of herds across 29 provinces.

What makes SADS-CoV especially concerning is its potential to cross into humans. In the wake of the original 2016–2017 outbreaks, no farm workers tested positive. But in the lab, SADS-CoV replicates efficiently in human lung and intestinal cells. It also kills newborn mice in controlled experiments. Those findings, scientists like Ralph Baric warn, are red flags. 

A virus that circulates widely in bats and pigs, can move between species, and can grow in human tissue cultures, has the hallmarks of a future spillover pathogen. That risk is heightened in China, where dense pig farms and frequent human-animal contact create the same kinds of conditions that made SARS-CoV-2 such a global threat. The NHG study stresses the need for close surveillance of both pigs and people in high-risk regions, so that early warnings are not missed.

But this urgent research exists in a poisoned political environment where science itself has been dragged into a political firestorm over the origins of COVID-19 and researchers like Daszak, who have been vilified by fascistic anti-science campaigns, face unwarranted hostility.

Since COVID-19, the very scientists who have worked for decades on spillover threats have been accused of causing the pandemic. Dr. Daszak and his former organization, EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), became scapegoats. Once regarded as a leading nonprofit in global pandemic prevention, EHA was targeted by conspiracy theories and congressional and media witch-hunting. 

In May 2024, under the Biden administration, the Department of Health and Human Services barred EcoHealth and Daszak from receiving federal funds for five years, a punishment usually reserved for proven fraud. By January 2025, Daszak was fired, and EcoHealth dissolved. This was even though the National Institutes of Health had repeatedly reviewed and approved the group’s coronavirus studies in China, and international biosafety experts found no evidence of the illegal “gain-of-function” research claimed by the conspiracy theorists.

The political campaign against Daszak reached its peak in the hearings of the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic. The committee, dominated by a bipartisan consensus hostile to China, treated the “lab leak” theory (the claim that COVID-19 originated through the leak of the deadly virus SARS-CoV-2 from the Wuhan Institute of Virology) as fact, and openly accused EcoHealth of wrongdoing. 

Daszak’s testimony was met with interruptions and bad-faith questioning, while detailed scientific rebuttals were dismissed or shouted down. Daszak would later describe the process as “McCarthyite, anti-science, anti-democratic, anti-China, and anti-communist.” The result was not only the destruction of EcoHealth, but the chilling of international scientific collaborations essential for stopping the next pandemic. Chinese partners who once co-authored studies on bat coronaviruses have become reluctant to be listed, fearing political consequences. 

Out of this wreckage, Daszak and former colleagues created Nature.Health.Global (NHG) in April 2025. The new institute seeks to continue pandemic prevention research while defending science from disinformation and politicization. Its mission is not just technical—sequencing viruses, modeling spillovers—but also political, meaning to “protect scientists and rebuild trust in evidence at a time when truth itself is under siege.” NHG has taken over the EcoHealth Journal as a platform for interdisciplinary research. But because of the federal ban, it now depends on foundations, private donors, and state-level grants. Much of the work, including the SADS-CoV study, is carried out by scientists volunteering their time, a testament both to their commitment and to the toll of the attacks against them.

The recent SADS-CoV research is thus more than a technical paper. It is emblematic of the crossroads at which science now stands. On one side, the virus itself—a pathogen with the ability to devastate pig populations, destabilize food security and potentially infect humans—and on the other, the political storm—the sustained campaign to discredit scientists, destroy international cooperation and replace evidence with fascist ideology. For Daszak and NHG, the fight is about both pandemics and politics. It is about whether the world will strengthen its defenses against spillover risks or continue to sabotage itself in the name of scapegoating and nationalism. Recently, Daszak and scientists from the US national academies and Nobel laureates have petitioned to remove Kennedy from his position, as he “poses an immediate and long-term threat to the health of the American public.” [Link is here.]

SADS-CoV, a crossover from bats to pigs

The World Socialist Web Site asked Dr. Daszak to speak about the latest publication and the current political climate scientists face. 

Benjamin Mateus (BM): You’ve just published a major study on SADS-CoV. Given your new chapter post-EcoHealth Alliance, and the political climate you’ve been navigating, what does this study represent—both scientifically and personally?

Peter Daszak: If you look at the paper, it’s pretty sad. Almost everyone listed has EcoHealth Alliance as their primary affiliation, but most now list a different current address—because nearly everyone was laid off after the study was defunded. That includes almost every author. This virus, SADS-CoV, we first discovered in 2018, before the COVID-19 pandemic. Even then, it stood out.

We found it during a large outbreak in South China. 25,000 piglets died from a severe diarrheal disease. There are plenty of viruses that affect pigs, but this one was different. When we sequenced it, we saw it was related to coronaviruses we’d already found in bats in the same region. So here we were again, with a bat-origin coronavirus causing a serious outbreak in livestock.

BM: That early?

PD: Yes, 2018. And we found clear ecological connections. We visited outbreak sites and saw evidence of bats roosting inside the pig barns. There were droppings, nests in the rafters, and these were not poorly managed farms. It showed that even in relatively controlled environments, you have a high risk of cross-species transmission.

Given the scale of pork production in Southeast Asia, how much is consumed, how it’s exported, this is a major vulnerability. The region is densely populated with both pigs and people. If these viruses are circulating among bats and pigs, the question becomes: how likely are spillovers to humans?

BM: And Ralph Baric’s lab showed something concerning about the virus and the possibility of infecting humans.

PD: Exactly. They demonstrated that the virus we discovered can bind to and infect human airway epithelial cells—the first line of defense in your respiratory tract. That means if someone inhales particles under a bat roost or while working in a pig barn, this virus could potentially infect them.

It also infects intestinal cells and causes disease in neonatal mice, which is a standard model for evaluating potential human pathogenicity. So, we have a virus with real zoonotic potential—and nobody’s really looking for it.

BM: And yet the message of the paper isn’t to panic, but to act.

PD: Yes. The idea isn’t fear-mongering. The goal is to understand where the risk lies, and how we can use that knowledge for prevention. What we’ve laid out is a model for predicting where spillover is most likely, based on viral diversity, bat species distribution, pig farm density, and human population clusters.

The bigger picture here—and I think this often gets lost—is that these emerging risks are a direct product of how we use the planet. Unchecked economic growth, industrial-scale agriculture, deforestation, wildlife exploitation—all of it increases viral spillover. If we don’t change those underlying drivers, we’ll remain in what I call the “pandemic era.”

BM: You’ve mentioned before how much we’ve learned about bats through this research. Physiologically, they’re really extraordinary mammals, the way they tolerate viruses without illness, their immune system modulation, flight metabolism. It’s not about them being “better” than humans, but they are incredibly well-adapted in ways that make them unique viral reservoirs.

PD: Right. I haven’t seen a bat using an iPhone yet, but yes, they are fascinating. Their physiology is very different. Their immune systems are tuned in a way that lets them coexist with viruses without getting sick, which allows them to carry a wide diversity of pathogens. That’s part of why they’re important to study, not just for understanding disease risk, but for understanding mammalian biology more broadly.

BM: And that helps frame the next part of your study, where you mapped where these viruses and their hosts are distributed, and what that means for spillover risk.

PD: Exactly. Once we had identified SADS-CoV in both bats and pigs, we wanted to better understand where the highest risks of future spillovers were. So, we compiled a large dataset, over 150 unique viral sequences from bats across China and parts of Southeast Asia.

We then identified the key bat species that seemed to carry the virus most consistently. One species in particular—Rhinolophus affinis—emerged as the primary reservoir. That’s the same genus implicated in SARS-CoV-2. Once we had that, we looked at their geographic distribution and layered that with human and pig population density data.

BM: So, you’re modeling risk at the interface: where bats, pigs, and people overlap.

PD: Yes. That’s how you get predictive. You ask: where do these high-risk bat species live? Where are the dense pig farms? Where are large human populations? That triad—bat, livestock, human—is where spillover events are most likely to occur.

And the overlap is significant. There are parts of South China, Vietnam, Thailand—hundreds of millions of people live near these ecological conditions. And contact isn’t just direct. These viruses are excreted in bat feces or possibly urine. If that contaminates a pigsty, a feed source, or gets aerosolized, transmission can happen without anyone touching a bat.

BM: Which makes clear how critical targeted intervention is—especially when governments may hesitate due to cost or political sensitivities.

PD: Exactly. And we try to make the case in the paper: if you can identify these high-risk regions, you can target your surveillance and prevention programs—spend less money, reduce more risk. It’s about smart, data-driven public health, not blanket panic or expensive overreach.

BM: Reading your paper, it’s clear that the experience of COVID-19 informed how you approached this research. The focus on population density, upstream factors—even the structure of your surveillance strategy seems to be influenced by what we’ve learned.

PD: Absolutely. In fact, population density and biodiversity overlap were part of our modeling long before COVID-19—back in the 2005 Nature paper we did with Jones et al. We found that most emerging infectious diseases correlate with high human population density and high wildlife biodiversity—exactly the kind of environment where spillovers thrive.

What the COVID pandemic did was make this real for the world. The work by Worobey and others on the Huanan Seafood Market confirmed everything we’ve been saying: dense human activity in a space with animals that host viruses is a perfect spillover scenario.

Cancellation of mRNA vaccine contracts

BM: And despite that evidence, there’s been a retreat from the very tools needed to respond. You’ve been vocal about what’s happening with this administration—the canceling of mRNA vaccine contracts, the cuts to research. What are the implications of that?

PD: It’s devastating. Canceling mRNA contracts—as the HHS Secretary recently did—is the opposite of what you do in the middle of a pandemic era. You don’t pull back. You double down. On vaccines, on therapeutics, on surveillance. And most of all—on prevention.

What’s driving the pandemic risk? It’s the same forces we’ve known for decades: overconsumption, land use change, industrial-scale farming, wildlife trade, climate disruption. If we don’t confront those drivers, we’ll keep seeing spillovers—and we won’t always be lucky enough to catch the next one in time.

BM: And now the scientists trying to do that kind of upstream prevention work are being defunded or targeted.

PD: Yes, and the consequences are already visible. EcoHealth Alliance was defunded under political pressure. Many governments we used to work with—especially in countries where these spillovers are most likely—are now reluctant to collaborate. They don’t want to be seen as the ones harboring dangerous viruses. It’s made our work harder, more isolated, and more urgent.

BM: How has your new organization, Nature Health Global, adapted to that?

PD: We’ve gotten support from private donors and some state funding, especially for U.S.-based work. We’re applying to foundations. But the big shift is that we’re doing this with far fewer resources and under far more scrutiny. Still, we’re committed to finishing what EcoHealth started. Even this SADS-CoV paper—all the original grants that funded the work were terminated before it was complete.

We finished it voluntarily. No salaries. No support. And now, through Nature Health Global, we’re going to continue publishing the data we collected and the science the world deserves to see.

BM: What you’ve described—especially the defunding and politicization—points to something larger. The Trump administration, RFK Jr., NIH Director Bhattacharya and FDA Commissioner Makary are systematically dismantling the institutions of public health. What’s your assessment of where this leaves science, not just in the U.S., but globally?

PD: It’s a real convergence of dangerous forces. What we’re seeing right now—particularly in the U.S.—is a deliberate decimation of science. That’s not rhetorical. The word “decimates” originally meant to destroy one in ten. At this rate, nine out of ten grants in the areas we work on are being cut or defunded.

And it’s not just domestic damage. When the U.S. retreats from science, the rest of the world suffers. WHO is already seeing a partial collapse. They expanded rapidly during the pandemic—setting up programs, hiring staff—and now the funding has dried up. There’s no continuity, no commitment. Meanwhile, U.S. leadership on science is collapsing under political assault.

BM: And it’s not just negligence, it’s active sabotage.

PD: That’s exactly what it is. Look at what Mr. Kennedy is doing. And I don’t call him RFK Jr.—I won’t give him the benefit of the [PD1]  and the false familiarity of the RFK moniker. He is not a scientist. He’s not trained in public health. And he is making decisions that are rooted in pseudoscience, resentment, and conspiracy thinking.

He is undermining not only individual programs, but the very foundation of how we respond to pandemics—from vaccines to research, to education and task forces. He is replacing experienced people with ideological allies. He is gutting institutions from within. This isn’t reform. It’s demolition.

BM: You’ve said before he should resign or be impeached.

PD: Without question. Mr. Kennedy must resign or be removed from office. His leadership is a threat to public health—not just in the U.S., but globally. His decisions will cost lives.

And he’s not alone. Makary, Bhattacharya, and others in this administration are equally responsible. These are not public servants guided by science. These are ideologues acting on retribution, not reason. They are gutting the country’s ability to protect itself. And the people who will pay for this are the public—including those who voted for them.

BM: With all this political interference, are you able to resume work in China or Southeast Asia?

PD: We’re beginning to reestablish work in Southeast Asia. I’m reconnecting with colleagues there, and you’ll likely see research emerging next year. But in China—no, not yet. I haven’t tried to resume that work, and frankly, the political environment makes it nearly impossible.

The tension goes both ways. The Chinese government sees this work as politically fraught—largely because of the enormous pressure they’ve come under from international scapegoating. Nobody wants to be labeled as the “origin” of the next pandemic. So, the collaboration that was once normal—collaborative virus discovery, data sharing—has collapsed.

You’ll notice in this SADS-CoV paper: there are only a couple of authors from China. The work was done there, and we acknowledge many others who contributed. But in today’s climate, they couldn’t be listed. Compare that to our 2018 paper on SADS—it was almost entirely Chinese authors. This shift shows you just how badly global science has been set back.

Preventing the next pandemic

BM: It feels like everything has been fractured—not just research, but the infrastructure that was supposed to protect us.

PD: Exactly. COVID-19 should’ve been the wake-up call. Instead, we’re sleepwalking into the next one.

Look back at 1918. After that pandemic, people didn’t want to talk about it. They buried it, emotionally and politically. It took decades to build even the most basic public health systems in response. My fear is we’re doing the same thing now.

People are pretending COVID is over. They don’t want to hear about the next one. They’re gutting programs, cutting task forces, defunding science. It’s denialism disguised as policy.

BM: So, what’s the alternative? What must happen?

PD: We need to build systems that prevent pandemics, not just respond to them. That means strengthening surveillance, investing in upstream science, and actually tackling the root causes: deforestation, agricultural intensification, wildlife exploitation, climate change.

You can’t just vaccinate your way out of the next pandemic. It’s not enough. These are new viruses coming from ecological disruption. If we don’t stop causing the problem, no amount of downstream response will be fast enough.

And we need to measure success not by how many pandemics we survive, but by how many we prevent. Right now, we’re just bracing for impact. We should be steering away from the storm.

BM: If there’s one principle you think should guide pandemic policy moving forward, what is it?

PD: It’s simple: put public health first. That should be the core function of government. Not profit. Not ideology. Not retribution. Public health.

That’s where the free-market model fails. Prevention requires long-term investment—not quarterly returns. You need to fund systems before disaster strikes, not just throw money at the aftermath. That’s what governments are supposed to do.

And the irony is, the government did do a lot right at the beginning of COVID-19. Agencies scrambled, developed vaccines at record speed, tried to coordinate a response. But now we’ve entered a phase of revisionism—where vaccines are demonized, lockdowns are caricatured, and the virus is blamed on a cartoon villain version of China. That’s not science. That’s propaganda.

BM: And that denial leaves us exposed.

PD: Exactly. If we keep pretending that COVID came from a lab and that public health measures “went too far,” we’ll be blindsided again, and next time, it could be worse.

So yes, we need better vaccines. Yes, we need faster diagnostics. But we also need political leadership that listens to scientists and understands the bigger picture, that pandemics come from us, from what we’re doing to the planet.

Until that reality is acknowledged—and acted upon—we’ll stay locked in this cycle of damage, denial, and devastation.

BM: I agree. We need a serious, actionable “lessons learned” framework, and not just in theory, but implemented.

PD: And we need to measure success not in how many new outbreaks we respond to, but how many we prevent. That’s the benchmark we should be using.

Because it will happen again. Another pandemic is coming, and if we don’t take the warning seriously this time, the consequences will be even greater.